Still unhappy DHS employee's

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AFGE, With Other Unions, Files Motion to Stop New Personnel Rules
WASHINGTON, Jun. 23 /PRNewswire/ --

WASHINGTON, June 23 /PRNewswire/ -- In announcing its decision to implement new and radical personnel regulations on August 1st, the Department of Homeland Security is rushing to put into practice rules whose legality have yet to be established. That's what the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) alleges in a suit filed, together with five other unions, in federal court this week. The unions are requesting a preliminary injunction that would bar DHS from moving ahead with the new rules until the federal court rules on a case, filed earlier this year by the unions, which challenges the legality of the new personnel system.

"It's hard to see how these new regulations will lead to greater security for the American people," said AFGE National President John Gage. "If anything, the chaos they will create in an already demoralized workforce bode ill for the security of the homeland."

In its Federal Human Capital Survey, the Office of Personnel Management found DHS workers to be the most dissatisfied among federal workers, citing poor leadership and confusing policies implemented by the agency's upper management. More than half of DHS respondents disagreed with the statement that leaders motivate them and commit them to their jobs.
"These new regulations are nothing more than a blatant and illegal power grab by the Administration," Gage said. "They run far afield of the authority granted by Congress for the creation of a new, national-security-driven personnel system.

"For instance," Gage continued, "these regulations eliminate all meaningful collective bargaining -- an obvious transgression of the Homeland Security Act, the legislation that created the Homeland Security Department. In that legislation, Congress called upon DHS to guarantee the collective bargaining rights of its employees.

"This new power-grab personnel system isn't just a bad deal for homeland security workers," Gage explained, "it's a bad deal for the American taxpayer. Without protected rights to due process, the ability of DHS employees to act as watchdogs within their agencies is greatly curtailed. A room-darkening shade is being pulled on the activities of the federal government."

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Here is another good article:



ONE FACE AT THE BORDER: BEHIND THE SLOGAN

June 23, 2005
Contact: Colleen Coffey, 202/266-1910
ccoffey@migrationpolicy.org

In less than two years, the Department of Homeland Security’s ambitious One Face at the Border initiative has made strides toward creating a unified agency to inspect people and goods at U.S. air, land and sea ports, according to a new report from the Migration Policy Institute. However, author Deborah Meyers finds that the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) still has significant weaknesses that could undermine border security if they are not confronted squarely and soon.

Meyers identifies the three most pressing priorities for making U.S. ports-of-entry both secure and efficient:

bring consistency and transparency to policymaking and implementation;
head off deficiencies in expertise and infrastructure through planning and partnerships; and
increase information-sharing and stress evaluation, both inside the agency and with outside partners.
The report, available June 23 at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Meyers_Report.pdf, finds that the integration of border inspectors from three legacy agencies at U.S. ports-of-entry – the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service – has had both positive and negative impacts. In other cases, little has changed since the September 2003 announcement.

On the plus side is better management, particularly the creation of a single chain of command with directors at ports-of-entry who can set policies and allocate resources throughout the port. Other improvements are port staffs that are more unified around the agency’s anti-terrorism mission and new security-oriented technology.

However, Meyers found critical weaknesses to be addressed. One of the most important is a lack of immigration expertise within CBP. Only four of 21 Field Operations Offices are headed by former INS employees, and some former long-serving and knowledgeable INS employees retired or ended up in DHS agencies or programs other than CBP after the merger. Inadequate expertise means that asylum seekers are treated inconsistently and inspectors are uncertain about some visa categories and the conditions associated with them, such as duration of stay. Meyers found that this is troubling to inspectors themselves. “As dedicated professionals who take pride in their work, they expressed discomfort with being asked to do their jobs without full training, particularly after having been told there is zero tolerance for errors.”
Practices such as periodic “traffic flushing” (waving cars through with little or no inspection to clear backlogs) at ports-of-entry are inconsistent with CBP’s most basic functions. Meyers asserts these problems present “challenges to the integrity of the immigration system, for US security, and for travelers who must deal with the consequences.”

Information, including feedback from the field, is poorly shared. Attempts to exert top-down message control compound this problem and contribute to a lack of transparency, unrealistic expectations about what the agency can accomplish, and unsubstantiated assertions regarding the program’s role in the war on terrorism. Assessing the program, including its contributions to security, has become more difficult because formal public outreach efforts such as meetings between the government and community-based groups or stakeholders have been eliminated or greatly reduced.

As the report says, “Without internal metrics, it is difficult to evaluate program effectiveness in terms of meeting stated goals or finding unintended impacts. It also is difficult to ensure that resources are being well spent or to develop necessary policy adjustments.”

These weaknesses in internal feedback and expertise have served the agency poorly both in terms of policy decisions and employee morale. Meyers found a great deal of fear and uncertainty among agency employees. Some of their major concerns were based on new standards of conduct including broad language regarding unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or classified information; continued representation by three different unions (and no representation for new CBP officers); a since-rescinded requirement that all DHS employees sign a secrecy pledge; and the revamping of the DHS human resource system to include a pay-for-performance system.

Many border users and agency employees noted the lack of visible change resulting from the One Face at the Border initiative. For example, physical infrastructure at and approaching ports-of-entry remains limited (e.g., a 75-year-old bridge and tunnel connect Detroit and Windsor), and inspection areas are outdated because they were built according to the specifications of the predecessor agencies.

Meyers writes, “When inspection lanes in the United States can be accessed only from a two-lane rural highway in British Columbia or from local roads that go right through congested downtown areas such as Tijuana, policy changes themselves are unlikely to have a significant impact on operations.”

Meyers concludes that for CBP to capitalize on gains made through One Face at the Border and to maximize efficiency and security at ports-of-entry, sufficient knowledge and expertise, clear policies and consistent implementation, partnership with employees and with outside stakeholders, a long-term vision, and a willingness to make necessary adjustments will be necessary. One Face at the Border has been primarily an organizational and management change. This alone cannot enhance security or facilitate legitimate traffic. Nevertheless, with realistic expectations it can contribute to achieving these goals as one component of a much broader effort.

Key Recommendations

Retaining and Developing Specialization and Expertise
To counter insufficient expertise and assist inspectors in navigating the complex laws, CBP should:

Create additional areas of specialization for CBP officers in passenger and cargo processing.
Continue to develop in-house expertise on fraudulent documents and on terrorist travel indicators and to enhance counterterrorism training for all of its inspectors.
Build additional training time into its personnel system, incorporate additional subject matter expertise into the training for new officers, and accelerate delivery of cross-training.
Reconsider the minimum requirements for the CBP officer positions, particularly compared to consular officers who screen visa applicants.
Ensure sufficient immigration expertise within CBP headquarters and promotion opportunities for former immigration employees in the field. This includes appointing a permanent head of the Immigration Policy Office in the Office of Field Operations.
Building a New Institutional Culture
In order to develop a new agency culture that values its employees and transparency, CBP should:

Keep its employees better informed and enhance mechanisms for employee feedback.
Resolve the outstanding personnel-related issues relating to the merger, including union representation. Fair and consistent pay, work, training and promotion opportunities under one set of rules should ameliorate concerns about job security and facilitate an integrated workforce.
Proactively address the climate of fear among employees, ensuring that those who speak out appropriately in the name of security are supported rather than suppressed.
Build a culture of transparency, including evaluations that are publicly accessible for input and review. This should include a reinstatement of the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force and reconnection with border agencies in other countries, including those in Canada and Mexico.
Exercise greater caution about public statements regarding the benefits of the program so as not to create unrealistic expectations.
Increasing Public Outreach

CBP should increase outreach efforts and actively seek input from and partnership with a broad range of actors and stakeholders at the local and national levels.
CBP also should develop a formal liaison mechanism, similar to that of the business-oriented Office of Trade Relations, for the community that deals with the movement of people.
Addressing Systemic Obstacles and Thinking Long Term
In order to streamline inspections both logistically and technologically, CBP should:

Review statutory requirements and mandates governing inspections to determine whether they could be simplified to reflect the new agency structure and security priorities.
Advocate within the government for database integration and access to that information.
Create a long-term plan for infrastructure expansion based on needs and capabilities at and approaching ports. This should be done in conjunction with facility operators, relevant transportation departments and Mexican and Canadian officials.
Actively expand and promote preclearance programs for frequent border crossers.
Explore and address systemic weaknesses that have led to traffic flushing – waving cars through with little or no inspection at ports-of-entry – a practice that undermines the agency’s mission.
Designate one individual in each region responsible for pulling together all the relevant public and private sector actors, possibly through reinstating border coordinators or through the creation of a broader regional authority.